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Daubert's Significance
Thomas G. Field, Jr. & Colleen M. Keegan*
The U.S. Supreme Court recently decided Daubert, possibly the
most important case to involve scientific evidence in seventy years.1
That case has received 2 and continues to receive3 much attention.
However, it is easy to overestimate its importance and difficult to know
its implications - particularly for engineers, physicians and scientists.
Background
The earlier case widely used to determine whether expert testimony
should be considered at trial, and was so used by lower courts in
Daubert,4 was Frye. That case had held:5
[W]hile courts will go a long way in admitting expert
testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific
principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction
is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
In Daubert, plaintiffs sought recovery for serious birth defects
allegedly suffered because two boys' mothers had used defendant's
anti-nausea drug. Defendant moved for summary judgment6 based on
an expert's affidavit that:7
* Mr. Field is Professor of Law and Ms. Keegan is candidate for the J.D., both at
Franklin Pierce Law Center.
1 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (Daubert), 61 U.S.L.W 4805 (U.S.
June 29, 1993).
2 Id., at 4810 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (twenty-two briefs were filed by others
than parties). One was filed by the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and
Government, author of a March, 1993 report entitled SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES AND MEETING CHALLENGES,
id at 82, n. 17.
3 See, e.g., Kenneth R. Foster, David E. Bernstein & Peter W. Huber, Science
and the Toxic Tort, 261 SCIENE 1509 (1993).
4 See, e.g., Daubert, 61 U.S.L.W. at 4807.
5 Frye v. U.S. (Frye), 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (emphasis added).
6 Summary judgment is proper if a trial is not needed to resolve issues of fact.
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he had reviewed all the literature... [and] concluded that
maternal use of Bendectin... has not been shown to be a risk
factor for human birth defects.
Based on Frye, evidence to the contrary was ruled inadmissible
because it had not been peer reviewed. After the trial court granted
defendant's motion, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Ultimately the
Supreme Court vacated the judgment and refranded for further
proceedings. 8
The Court's Opinions
Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun observed:9
The merits of the Frye test have been much debated, and
scholarship on its proper scope and application is legion.
Petitioners' primary attack, however, is not on the content
but on the continuing authority of the rule. They contend that
the Frye test was superseded by the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. We agree.
He then quoted Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence: 10 "All
relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided....
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." Mentioning that such
rules supersede earlier law except to the extent that the latter may help to
understand them, he also quoted Rule 702 as most pertinent. 11
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Justice Blackmun then stated that the "austere standard" represented
by Frye, "absent from and incompatible with the Federal Rules of
Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials." 12 Yet, he began the
next section of his opinion by stating: 13
7 Daubert, 61 U.S.L.W. at 4806.
8 Id. (more detailed procedural history).
9 Id. at 4807.
10 Id.
I1 Id.
12 Id. at 4808.
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That the Frye test was displaced... does not mean,
however, that the Rules themselves place no limits on the
admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence. Nor is the
trial judge disabled from screening such evidence. To the
contrary, under the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any
and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only
relevant, but reliable.
In favor of liberal admissibility, Justice Blackmun noted that
"scientists do not assert that they know what is immutably 'true' - they
are committed to searching for new, temporary theories to explain, as
best they can, phenomena ' 14 and that science "represents a process
for proposing and refining theoretical explanations about the world that
are subject to further testing and refinement." 15 Thus, judges make a
"preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that
reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in
issue." 16 Jurors determine the credibility of what survives.
Finally, to answer Frye proponents, Justice Blackmun stated:17
We conclude by briefly addressing what appear to be
two underlying concerns.... Respondent expresses
apprehension that abandonment of "general acceptance"...
will result in a "free-for-all" in which befuddled juries are
confounded by absurd and irrational pseudoscientific
assertions. In this regard respondent seems to us to be
overly pessimistic about the capabilities of the jury, and of
the adversary system generally. Vigorous cross-examin-
ation, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruc-
tion on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate
means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.
Only with regard to factors judges might use in screening evidence
did Justice Rehnquist dissent.18 He was disturbed by a statement that
"the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or
13 Id.
14 Id. (quoting the amicus brief for Nicholas Bloemberger et al.).
15 Id. (quoting the amicus brief for the American Association for the Advancement
of Science and the National Academy of Sciences).
16 Id. at 4809.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 4810 (he was joined only by Justice Stevens).
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refutability, or testability," 19 and wrote, e.g., that, while he has great
respect for federal judges, "I am at a loss to know what is meant when it
is said that the scientific status of a theory depends on its 'falsifiability,'
and I suspect some of them will be, too."20
Assuming the Demise of Frye
The limited reach of Daubert must be appreciated. Most tort or
criminal cases that might use scientific evidence are governed by state
law, and the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal rules of
evidence, in contrast with its cases decided under the U.S. Constitution,
binds neither state courts nor legislatures. In short, whether states
follow Daubert remains to be seen.
Without discussing such matters, one article has assumed the
general demise of Frye and issued what seems to be a call to arms.
With a cautionary, but obscure, reference to antitrust law, it suggests
that professional technical societies should generate codes that "address
directly or indirectly the problems of eccentric and unreliable
testimony."2 1
Assuming that muzzling or ostracizing mavericks and quacks could
or would work as intended, valuable resources might nevertheless be
directed elsewhere. It seems more productive in the short term for
members of such societies to direct their efforts toward developing and
testing materials useful for helping judges and juries distinguish science
from pseudoscience. 22 Indeed, if all technically trained people were,
over the longer term, to actively champion deeper and broader science
literacy, we would have far less need for concerns dismissed at the end
of Daubert, and society as a whole would generally be better off.
19 Id. at4811.
20 Id.
21 Foster et al., supra note 3, at 1614.
22 An unusually solid step in that direction is represented by THOMAS GILOVICH,
HOW WE KNOW WHAT ISN'T So: THE FALLiBiLrrY OF REASON IN EVERYDAY LIFE
(1991), reviewed at 3 RISK 179 (1992).
